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Reep: Administrative Law

MONTANA SUPREME COURT
SURVEY
SURVEY EDITOR'S NOTE

This issue of Volume 42 contains the annual Montana Supreme Court Survey in its entirety. The primary purpose of the
survey is to present analysis, research and discussion of Montana
Supreme Court decisions for 1980 which have significant impact on
specific areas of law. Case selection was left to the discretion of the
individual authors. A review of cases relating to estates and trusts
provided little material of importance to the Montana practitioner
and therefore was excluded. However, a comment on recent legislative changes in Montana probate law appears in another part of
this issue.
The Montana Law Review thanks the faculty of the University
of Montana School of Law for advice and assistance generously
given to this project.
Bruce 0. Bekkedahl

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INTRODUCTION

While the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA)
has been in existence for nearly ten years, the process of interpreting and applying its provisions has barely begun. Few administrative law cases reach the Montana Supreme Court but those that do
have an enormous impact on state agencies which in turn have an
ever increasing impact on all Montana citizens. This survey will
examine the cases decided during 1980 which have a direct effect
on application of MAPA. It is not an attempt to deal with changes
in substantive areas of administrative law. Rather, it will summarize and explain those cases which construe and apply MAPA.
I.

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS-NOTICE

In Board of Trustees v. Board of Personnel Appeals,' the
1.

-

Mont.

-,

604 P.2d 778 (1979).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1981

1

330

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 42 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 6

[Vol. 42'

Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed its liberal interpretation 2 of
the notice provisions of MAPA.' Fair notice, the court held, is
given where the pleadings state the statutory basis for the complaint and allege facts to support the charge. 4 In Board of Trustees, the Billings Educational Association (BEA) had filed a complaint with the Board of Personnel Appeals in which BEA alleged
that the Billings school district had violated two subsections of the
Collective Bargaining Act' by refusing to bargain. In its brief, BEA
contended that the school district had coerced the teachers. After a
hearing the examiner concluded that there had been a violation of
the Collective Bargaining Act by the school district's failure to bargain, but the complaint failed to give the school district fair notice
of the coercion charge. The Board of Personnel Appeals, however,
concluded that coercion was present and so rendered its decision.
The school district's petition for judicial review was denied by the
district court.
In affirming the district court decision, the supreme court
looked to the MAPA requirement that notice include "a short and
plain statement of the matters asserted"' and found that fair notice had been given. Notice, the court held, is sufficient where
under a liberal construction of the charging party's pleadings the
charged party should have been aware of the issues it would have
to defend.7
Although the court's attitude toward liberal construction of
administrative pleadings had been announced previously,' the decision in Board of Trustees appears to go much further. The court
did not address the fact that unlike the Montana Rules of Civil
2. See text accompanying note 7 infra.
3. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 2-4-601 (1979).
4. Board of Trustees, - Mont. -, 604 P.2d at 780.
5. MCA §§ 39-31-401(1), -401(5) (1979).
6. MCA § 2-4-601(2) (1979) states:
The notice must include:
(a) a statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing;
(b) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is
to be held;
(c) a reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved;
(d) a short and plain statement of the matters asserted. If the agency or other
party is unable to state the matters in detail at the time the notice is served, the
initial notice may be limited to a statement of the issues involved, thereafter,
upon application, a more definite and detailed statement must be furnished.
(e) a statement that a formal proceeding may be waived pursuant to 2-4-603.
7. Board of Trustees, - Mont. -, 604 P.2d at 780.
8. Western Bank of Billings v. Montana State Banking Bd., 174 Mont. 331, 335-36,
570 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1977).
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Procedure,9

MAPA sets forth what "notice" must include.10 Under
MAPA, a "short and plain statement of the matters asserted" is
neither necessary nor sufficient for purposes of notice. It is unnecessary if "a statement of issues involved is furnished."1 It is
insufficient in that the statute requires at least four other separate
statements.1" Furthermore, when read in its entirety, the section
prescribing a short and plain statement implies a detailed
statement.13
Despite these statutory notice requirements it is apparent that
the Montana Supreme Court will construe administrative pleadings broadly. Further, if the pleadings appear to give notice, the
charged party, if in doubt, must affirmatively act to request a more
definite statement. In light of Board of Trustees, the practitioner
would be well advised to request a more definite statement each
time pleadings do not present a statement of specific issues. In the
case of a charging party, reliance on Board of Trustees in drafting
pleadings should be limited in light of the particular MAPA requirements for notice.
II. JuDiciAL RvIEw-CoNTESTED CASES

A.

Service

MCA § 2-4-702(2)(a) (1979) provides in relevent part:
Proceedings for review shall be instituted by filing a petition in
district court within 30 days after service of the final decision of
the agency .... Copies of the petition shall be promptly served

upon the agency and all parties of record.
In Rierson v. State, 4 the appellant, a retired highway patrolman, had filed a claim with the Board of Administration seeking
additional retirement benefits. The appellant's claim had been
prompted by a Board ruling stating that retirement allowances
should never exceed one-half of a patrolman's salary regardless of
the number of years of service. That ruling was different from the
ruling in effect during nearly all of appellant's active duty as a patrolman. A hearing was held and relief was denied. A petition for
9. MoNr. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
10. MCA § 2-4-601(2) (1979). See note 6 supra.
11. MCA § 2-4-601(2)(d) (1979).
12. MCA §§ 2-4-601(2)(a) through -601(2)(e) (1979).
13. MCA § 2-4-601(2)(d) (1979) states: "Ifthe agency or other party is unable to state
the matters in detail at the time notice is served, the initial notice may be limited to a
statement of the issues involved." (Emphasis added).
14. - Mont. -, 614 P.2d 1020 (1980).
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judicial review was filed within 30 days of notification of the
agency's decision but a summons was never served. Sixteen months
later an amended petition and summons were served on the
agency. Both the original and amended petitions were dismissed
with prejudice by the district court for failure to prosecute. Rierson appealed the district court's decision on the grounds that MCA
§ 2-4-102(2)(a) (1979) was unconstitutionally vague and violated
his right to equal protection.
By a three to two majority the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision. The issue involved was whether
service of copies of the petition "promptly" upon the agency15 requires service sooner than the three-year time limit prescribed by
Rule 41(e) of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. Here the majority ruled that "promptly" required service "within thirty days,
or thereabouts, from the time the petition was filed" in district
court.'6
Justices Sheehy and Daly dissented. Noting that Rierson's pey
tition for judicial review involved a tort claim against the agenc 7
and a claim of deprivation of constitutional protection, 8 their dissent considered Rierson's petition for judicial review a "separate
complaint on the tort and constitutional issues."1 9 Since MAPA
specifically provides that "other means of review" are not precluded by the judicial review provisions, 0 the dissenting justices
objected to the majority decision which effectively cut off Rierson's
right of action against the agency by enforcing a procedural requirement applicable only to judicial review of that agency's
decision.
With the closeness of this decision and the addition of two
new members to the Montana Supreme Court, the precedential
value of Rierson may be questioned. However, this case contains at
least two points worthy of note. First, upon filing a petition for
judicial, review copies of the petition should be served upon the
agency and all other parties without delay. In the words of the majority, service within "thirty days, or thereabouts" should suffice.
Second, if the basis of petitioner's appeal is a tort allegedly committed by the agency whose decision is being appealed, or if the
15. MCA § 2-4-702(2)(a) (1979).
16. Rierson, - Mont. -, 614 P.2d at 1024.
17. Rierson had alleged promissory estoppel in regard to the retirement ruling he had
worked under. Rierson, - Mont. -, 614 P.2d at 1025 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
18. Rierson had alleged deprivation of due process and equal protection by the agency.
Id.
19. Id.
20. MCA § 2-4-702(1)(a) (1979).
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agency's decision is allegedly unconstitutional, a separate action
may be commenced. Justice Sheehy suggests a petition for writ of
certiorari. 2 By utilizing a writ of certiorari the petitioner is not
subject to the procedural requirements and time limits included in
MAPA.
In order to obtain a writ of certiorari the petitioner must
show, among other things, that the agency has exceeded its jurisdiction.2 2 Agency determination of the constitutionality of its own
decision or agency determination of its own tort liability would
certainly be action in excess of its jurisdiction.2 Of course, this
alone does not satisfy all the elements necessary to obtain a writ of
certiorari.2 However, should a party find himself in a position such
as that described in Rierson, application for a writ of certiorari
would be a prudent course of action.2 5
B.

Venue

MAPA provides that in petitions for judicial review of contested cases "the petition shall be filed in the district court for the
county where the petitioner resides or has his principal place of
business or where the agency maintains its principal office."'26 The
party initiating the petition for judicial review appears to be in a
position to select the appropriate district court from among the
three possible forums. In Montana Health Systems Agency, Inc. v.
Montana Board of Health and Environmental Sciences,27 the
Montana Supreme Court decided that the venue section of MAPA
meant what it appeared to say.
The petitioner in Montana Health Systems brought his petition in Lewis and Clark County. Later, the Missoula hospital, on
21. Rierson, - Mont. -, 614 P.2d at 1025 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). Montana specifically
provides for granting a writ of certiorari by "the Supreme Court or the district court...
when an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded the
jurisdiction of such tribunal, board, or officer and there is no appeal or in the judgment of
the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy." MCA § 27-25-102(2) (1979).
22. Id. See, e.g., In re Dewar, 169 Mont. 437, 442, 548 P.2d 149, 153 (1976). The petitioner must also demonstrate lack of any plain, speedy and adequate remedy and observe
the right of appeal. Id.
23. See In re Dewar, 169 Mont. 437, 548 P.2d 149 (1976).
24. See note 22 supra.
25. To date the Montana Supreme Court has ruled on the applicability of the writ of
certiorari to an administrative decision in only one case. In In re Dewar, 169 Mont. 437, 444,
548 P.2d 149, 153 (1976), the court held that the writ of certiorari "is not proper where the
proceedings to be reviewed are pending or undetermined." Thus, the court implied that
once the proceeding was complete and a determination rendered the decision could be subject to the writ.
26. MCA § 2-4-702(2)(a) (1979).
27. - Mont. -, 612 P.2d 1275 (1980).
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whose behalf the respondent had issued a Certificate of Need, was
allowed to intervene. The hospital moved for a change of venue
citing the general venue provisions found at MCA §§ 25-2-105,
-201 (1979).'

The district court denied the motion citing the venue

provision of MAPA, MCA § 2-4-702(2)(a) (1979), as controlling. On
appeal, the supreme court held that MCA § 2-4-702(2)(a) (1979)
controlled since it was specifically referred to by the statutory provision relating to venue for judicial review of decisions on applications for Certificates of Need.29
The court could have ruled that since judicial review of this
decision was governed by MAPA, and since MAPA contains a specific venue provision, the general venue statutes were not controlling.3 0 Nevertheless, the court went on to find a specific reference
to the MAPA venue provisions in the statutes governing Certificates of Need. This rationale may encourage future litigants to argue that where the administrative agency's controlling statutes do
not specifically refer to the venue provisions of MAPA the general
venue statutes control.
28. MCA § 25-2-105 (1979) provides:
Actions against public officers or their agents. Actions against a public officer or
person specifically appointed to execute his duties for an act done by him in virtue
of his office or against a person who, by his command or in his aid, does anything
touching the duties of such officer must be tried in the county where the cause or
some part thereof arose, subject to the power of the court to change the place of
trial.
MCA § 25-2-201 (1979) provides:
When change of venue required. The court or judge must, on motion, change the
place of trial in the following cases:
(1) when the county designated in the complaint is not the proper
county;
(2) when there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had
therein;
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be
promoted by the change.
29. Montana Health Systems, - Mont. -, 612 P.2d at 1276, citing MCA § 50-5-306(4)
(1979).
30. The court fails to mention its decision in State ex rel. Hendrickson v. Gallatin
County, 165 Mont. 135, 526 P.2d 354 (1974). There, the court held that where a petition was
brought to review the administrative proceedings of the Board of Social and Rehabilitative
Appeals the proper statute to apply in determining venue was Revised Codes of Montana
(1947) § 82-4216(2) [now MCA § 2-4-702(2)(a) (1979)] and not the general venue statute
now found in MCA § 25-2-106 (1979). Hendrickson, 165 Mont. at 139, 526 P.2d at 357. Quite
clearly Hendrickson stands for the proposition that in judicial review of administrative decisions covered by MAPA, MCA § 2-4-702(2)(a) (1979) controls. See also McCrory, Administrative Procedures in Montana: A View After Four Years with the Montana Administrative ProcedureAct, 38 MoNT. L. REv. 1, 19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as McCrory].
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C.

Standard of Review

The court's standard for review of contested cases is set forth
at MCA § 2-4-704 (1979). Where a question of fact is presented,
the court "may not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency" 31 unless the findings are "clearly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." 2 Where a question of law is presented, no such limitation is
prescribed,33 and it is generally conceded that the court may substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.3 4 Thus, the court's
first step in reviewing an administrative decision must be to determine which issues are questions of law and which are questions of
fact. Often, however, the issue presented is a mixture of law and
fact. In those cases the standard for review is not so readily
apparent.
Standard Chemical Manufacturing Co. v. Employment Security Division" presented the Montana Supreme Court with a
mixed issue of law and fact. In Standard Chemical, the issue on
appeal was "whether respondent's salesmen might be deemed to
stand in the relationship of 'employment'" as defined in Montana's statutes. 6 In order to decide the issue, the court had to both
interpret the statutory definition of "employment" ' 7 and apply the
facts of the case to the definition. Relying on a United States Supreme Court decision in a similar situation, 8 the Montana court
determined that its reviewing function was limited and stated that
"[w]here factual determinations are warranted by the record and
have a reasonable basis in law, they are to be accepted."39 Thus,
31. MCA § 2-4-704(2) (1979).
32. MCA § 2-4-704(2) (1979) provides in relevant part that "the court may reverse or
modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings . . . are: . . . (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record."
33. MCA § 2-4-704(2) (1979) provides in relevant part that "the court may reverse or
modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative . . . conclusions . . . are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions."
34. McCrory, supra note 30, at 20-22. See generally Sharp v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp.,
_ Mont. -, 584 P.2d 1298, 1301 (1978). For application of this principle in the federal context see, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493 (1947).
35. - Mont. -, 605 P.2d 610 (1980).
36. Standard Chemical, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d at 613.
37. MCA § 39-51-203(4) (1979).
38. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 332 U.S. 111 (1943). In Hearst, the Court deferred
to the agency's application of the statute as having a "reasonable basis in law." Id. at 131.
Nevertheless, the Court left no doubt that statutory interpretation was solely the court's
.province. Id. at 130-31.
39. Standard Chemical, - Mont. -, 605 P.2d at 613.
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the court chose to consider the issue an application of a statute
and not strictly an interpretationof a statute. Having so decided,
the court applied the MAPA standard for questions of
fact-clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record-and held that the district court
had abused its discretion in reversing the agency's determination. 0
Standard Chemical appears to be a clear signal from the Montana Supreme Court that agency decisions involving mixed questions of law and fact, to the extent the decision involves statutory
application, shall be subject to the same standards of review as
simple questions of fact.
In a subsequent case, In re Shaw,41 the court considered the
clearly erroneous test as it applied to pure questions of fact. In
Shaw, the agency had made findings of fact which were subsequently affirmed by the district court. On appeal the supreme
court affirmed both the agency's decision and the district court's
ruling. Despite conflicting testimony the supreme court found "reliable and substantial evidence" in the record which supported the
agency's findings."2 Refusing to substitute its "judgment for that of
the administrative body," the court applied the clearly erroneous
standard and upheld the agency's decision. 8
Eleven months after clarifying the standards for review in
Standard Chemical, the court decided Thornton v. Commission of
the Department of Labor and Industry." As far as Standard
Chemical went in clarifying the court's standards for review,
Thornton goes an equal distance in muddling the issue. In Thornton, the court was faced with two specific issues involving statutory
interpretation. 4' The first issue required an interpretation of MCA
§ 39-3-206 (1979)46 while the second issue required an interpreta40. Id. at -, 605 P.2d at 615-16.
41. - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 910 (1980).
42. Id. at -, 615 P.2d at 915.
43. Id.
44. - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1062 (1980).
45. The issues as framed by the court were:
1. Did the District Court err in affirming the decision of the hearings examiner to
assess a statutory penalty to the balance due at the time of the hearing rather
than the amount due at the initiation proceeding?
2. Did the District Court err in affirming the decision of the hearings examiner
refusing to award attorney fees to appellant at the administrative hearing level?
Thornton, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1064.
46. MCA § 39-3-206 (1979) provides that:
Penalty for failure to pay wages at times specified in law. Any employer, as such
employer is defined in this part, who fails to pay any of his employees as provided
in this part or violates any other provision of this part shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. A penalty shall also be assessed against and paid by such employer and
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tion of MCA § 39-3-214 (1979).11
The court began its analysis by stating that "there exists a rebuttable presumption in favor of the decision of the agency and
the burden of proof is on the party attacking it to show that it is

erroneous.""8 The court then announced that it "may not substitute its judgment for that of the . . . agency as to the weight of
evidence on questions of fact."' ' Finally, the court concluded that
(1) the clearly erroneous test applied in Thornton and that (2) "a
finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to
support it, a review of the entire record leaves the court with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."50
Having thus set the stage for reviewing a question of fact, the court
began the process of interpreting the statutes involved. Statutory
interpretation presents, by its very nature, a question of law.
Thornton appears to extend the clearly erroneous test to ques-

tions of law. The basis for such an extension is not found in
MAPA51 nor is it found in Standard Chemical. Statutory interprebecome due such employee as follows: a sum equivalent to the fixed amount of 5%
of the wages due and unpaid shall be assessed for each day, except Sundays and
legal holidays, upon which such failure continues after the day upon which such
wages were due, except that such failure shall not be deemed to continue more
than 20 days after the date such wages were due.
Appellant's contention was that the "District Court made a clear error of law in direct contravention of the statute." Thornton, _ Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1064.
47. MCA § 39-3-214 (1979) provides that:
Court costs and attorneys' fees. (1) Whenever it is necessary for the employee to
enter or maintain a suit at law for the recovery or collection of wages due as provided for by this part, a resulting judgment must include a reasonable attorney's
fee in favor of the successful party, to be taxed as part of the costs in the case.
- (2) Any judgment for the plaintiff in a proceeding pursuant to this part must
include all costs reasonably incurred in connection with the proceeding, including
attorneys' fees.
(3) If the proceeding is maintained by the commissioner, no court costs or
fees are required of him nor is he required to furnish any bond or other security
that might otherwise be required in connection with any phase of the proceeding.
Appellant contended that MCA § 39-3-214 (1979) mandated an award of attorney's fees to
the successful party at the administrative and district court levels. Thornton, - Mont. _,
621 P.2d at 1064.
48. Thornton, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1064-65. The court cites Partoll v. Anaconda
Copper Mining Co., 122 Mont. 305, 203 P.2d 974 (1949) and Kerns v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 87 Mont. 546, 289 P. 563 (1930) as support for this proposition. Both Partoll
and Kerns involved issues of fact.
49. Thornton, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1065, citing MCA § 2-4-704(2) and Robins v.
Anaconda Aluminum Co., 175 Mont. 514, 575 P.2d 67 (1978) (question of fact regarding
preexisting injuries).
50. Thornton, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d at 1065, citing United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). In United States Gypsum, the Court applied this
"clearly erroneous" test to the findings of the trial court while specifically noting that it
could "of course, correct ... errors of law." Id. at 394.
51. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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tation in Thornton can and should be distinguished from statutory
applicationin Standard Chemical. In Thornton there was no mixing of law and fact. Thornton merely required the court to interpret certain statutes pertaining to time of attachment of penalty
and availability of attorneys' fees.
What the practitioner may glean from Thornton is unclear. It
seems unlikely that the court intends to apply the clearly erroneous test to questions of law.5 2 However, unless Thornton is distinguished in subsequent cases, petitions for judicial review of administrative decisions involving questions of law must give at least lip
service to the clearly erroneous test.
D. Review of Agency Rules
MAPA provides two methods of testing the validity of an
agency's rules in court.53 First, an action for declaratory judgment
may be initiated." Each agency must provide rules for "filing and
prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory rulings."" However,
neither petitioning the agency nor an agency ruling is a condition
precedent to filing for declaratory relief in district court." If the
declaratory judgment petition is filed with the agency, the agency's
ruling will be "subject to judicial review in the same manner as
57
decisions or orders in contested cases.'

Second, the party may appeal the decision of the agency in a
contested case"' as being in "excess of the statutory authority of
the agency." 9 The party would then argue that the basis for a decision was an agency rule which was void ab initio under MAPA's
requirements for validity.60 Care must be taken to raise the issue of
validity at the earliest opportunity.61
52. If the court did intend such an application, the administrative agency is put in a
position to interpret the law that not even the lower courts enjoy. See, e.g., Sharp v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., - Mont. -, 584 P.2d 1298, 1301 (1978). See also note 34 supra and
accompanying text.
53. Larson v. State, 166 Mont. 449, 534 P.2d 854 (1975) suggests a third method. In
Larson taxpayers went directly into district court claiming that the State's use of rules for
real property appraisal was unconstitutional. In affirming the district court's judgment the
supreme court stated that there was no need for the appellants to exhaust administrative
remedies before going directly to court since the agency could not pass on the constitution-

ality of
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

the question. Id. at 457, 534 P.2d at 858.
MCA § 2-4-506 (1979).
MCA § 2-4-501 (1979).
MCA § 2-4-506(4) (1979).
MCA § 2-4-501 (1979).
MCA § 2-4-102(4) (1979).
MCA § 2-4-704(2)(b) (1979).
MCA § 2-4-305 (1979).
MCA § 2-4-702(I)(b) (1979) may preclude the issue from being raised in district
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Michels v. Department of Social and RehabilitativeServices"
presents a case which impliedly adopts the second method. In
Michels, the indigent victim of an auto accident failed to apply for
county medical benefits within the five days prescribed in a regulation promulgated by the State Welfare Department 3 and her application was denied. The district court ruled that the regulation
was a valid exercise of the agency's power. The supreme court reversed, holding that the rule was "patently unreasonable" on its
64
face and wrongfully deprived appellant of medical benefits.

The court's rationale for invalidating the regulation was that
the agency had promulgated a rule which was in conflict with the
statute under which it had been enacted. The court relied on case
law6 5 but clearly could have looked to the validity requirements of

MAPA66 to declare the rule invalid ab initio.

E. Sufficiency of Agency's Findings
Where findings of fact essential to the decision are not made,
although requested, the court may overturn the agency's decision.6 7
In In re Shaw," the supreme court applied MAPA to a situation
where certain findngs of fact were not made and, on appeal, were
claimed to be essential to the decision. 9 Refusing to upset the
agency's decision, the court held that the appellant had not met
his burden of showing that the finding in dispute was "so essential
.. .that to omit it alters the outcome of the decision or prejudices
'70
appellants rights.

III.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN AGENCY OPERATION

Although Montana's open meeting law is not included in
MAPA, its application affects the operation of each administrative
court where the issue was not raised before the agency.
62.

-

Mont.

-,

609 P.2d 271 (1980).

63. Administrative Rules of Montana [hereinafter cited as ARM] § 46-2.10(38)S101950 [now codified at ARM § 46.9.501].
64.

Michels,

-

Mont.

-,

609 P.2d at 274.

65. Bell v. Department of Licensing, - Mont. -, 594 P.2d 331 (1979) (agency regulation declared invalid because it engrafted additional requirements on the controlling statute); State ex rel. Swart v. Casne, 172 Mont. 302, 564 P.2d 983 (1977) (agency regulation in
direct conflict with controlling statute declared invalid).
66. MCA § 2-4-305(5) (1979) states that "no rule adopted is valid or effective unless
consistent with and not in conflict with the statute and reasonably necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the statute."
67. MCA § 2-4-704(2)(g) (1979).
68.
69.

-

70.

Id.

Mont. -, 615 P.2d 910 (1980).
Id. at -, 615 P.2d at 915.
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agency and recent developments deserve some comment.
MCA § 2-3-203(1) (1979) declares that "[a]ll meetings of public or governmental bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions, agencies
of the state, or any political subdivision of the state or organizations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public funds or
expending public funds shall be open to the public." The teeth in
71
the open meeting law are contained in MCA § 2-3-213 (1979).
That section gives the district court the power to void meetings
not complying with MCA § 2-3-203 (1979). These provisions were
addressed and construed in Board of Trustees, Huntley Project v.
Board of County Commissioners."
In that case, two commissioners voted to approve a preliminary plat two days after holding a public meeting on that plat. Although two commissioners constituted a majority, the actual vote
was taken by telephone without public notice or notice to the third
commissioner. The board of trustees petitioned the district court
for a writ of mandamus compelling the commissioners to void the
meeting. The district court decided that the open meeting statute
had indeed been violated but refused to nullify the actions of the
commissioners.73
On appeal the supreme court held that the district court had
"abused its discretion in finding an illegal meeting but failing to
nullify the actions taken by the Yellowstone County Commissioners."7' 4 The court had little difficulty finding that the telephone
vote taken by the commissioners constituted a "meeting" within
the meaning of the open meeting law. 5 The court also disposed of
respondents' contention that newspaper reports that a decision
was to be made "today or tomorrow" satisfied the statutory notice
requirements.7 6 Presenting a more difficult question, however, was
the interpretation of MCA § 2-3-213 (1979) particularly the portion declaring that the meeting "may be declared void by a district
court having jurisdiction. '77 The district court had viewed this sec71. MCA § 2-3-213 (1979) provides that "[a]ny decision made in violation of 2-3-203
may be declared void by a district court having jurisdiction. A suit to void any such decision
must be commenced within 30 days of the decision."
72. - Mont. -, 606 P.2d 1069 (1980).
73. The district court declared that the power to void the meeting was discretionary
and refused to exercise that discretion. Id. at -, 606 P.2d at 1073.
74. Id. at -, 606 P.2d at 1075.
75. In fact the definitional section, MCA § 2-3-202 (1979), specifically includes "the
convening of a quorum of the constituent membership of a public agency, whether corporal
or by means of electronic equipment, to hear, discuss or act upon a matter over which the
agency has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power." (Emphasis added).
76. Huntley Project, - Mont. -, 606 P.2d at 1073.
77. Emphasis added.
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tion as discretionary rather than mandatory. The supreme court
held that unless the meeting was proved "legal" the district court
must nullify the actions taken at the meeting.78 Thus, the court
appears to be saying that voiding an illegal meeting is not discretionary once the meeting is found to be illegal. 9
Another issue in Huntley Project was whether mandamus was
the proper remedy. The court agreed that mandamus would not
"lie to correct or undo an act already performed." 80 Nevertheless,
the court approved mandamus in this case because the meeting
was void from the beginning. This ruling was tempered by the
court's caveat that "[in the future . . . the suit should take the
form of a simple petition to void an action or a petition for declaratory judgment." 81
IV.

CONCLUSION

These recent cases demonstrate that the court is continuing to
give a literal interpretation to MAPA in most areas of application.
However, in the wake of Thornton and Standard Chemical no
clear standard for judicial review of issues of fact versus issues of
law has emerged. Despite this single gray area, MAPA and its
effect on Montana's agencies is becoming more defined.
Richard A. Reep

78. Huntley Project, - Mont. -, 606 P.2d at 1074.
79. MCA § 2-3-213 (1979) clearly states that the district court "may" declare the
meeting void. The holding here would appear to make the "may" a "shall." Nevertheless, a
careful reading of the opinion will show that the court's major concern was for particular
"disregard" of the open meeting law shown by the commissioners "in terms of notice and
place and voting procedure." Huntley Project, - Mont. -, 606 P.2d at 1074. Room has been
left to distinguish a case where an attempt to comply with the open meeting laws was made
but simply failed leaving the meeting technically illegal. In that event the "may" could conceivably be reinstated as discretionary.
80. Huntley Project, - Mont. _, 606 P.2d at 1074, citing Kadillak v. Anaconda Co., Mont. -, 602 P.2d 147 (1979).
81. Huntley Project, - Mont. _, 606 P.2d at 1075.
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